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Abstract
According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rational-
ity requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes
with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve
this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omni-
science requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key in-
sight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that
permits logical ignorance. This includes: (i) an account of the syn-
chronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given
time; (ii) an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learn-
ing logical facts and how we should update our credences in response
to such evidence; and (iii) an account of when logical ignorance is ir-
rational and when it isn’t. At the end, I explain why the requirement
of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computa-
tional, processing, or storage limitations.
According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality re-
quires us to be logically omniscient. We should believe or be certain of
every logical truth; we should believe something if and only if we be-
lieve everything logically equivalent to it, and we should be confident in
something to exactly the same degree we’re confident in anything logically
equivalent to it; if we believe something, we should believe all its logi-
cal consequences, and we should be no more confident in something than
we are in any of its logical consequences; and so on. For instance, if you
think that we should believe everything we have reason to believe, and
if you think that the truth of each tautology gives us reason to believe it,
∗I am grateful to the following people for helping me to think through the issues
in this paper: Branden Fitelson, Catrin Campbell-Moore, Jason Konek, Johannes Stern,
Kevin Dorst, Julia Staffel, Jennifer Carr, Sophie Horowitz, David Christensen, and Kenny
Easwaran. I started working on the paper after David Thorstad, Ned Hall, and Branden Fi-
telson invited me to speak at their workshop on bounded rationality at Harvard in October
2019, and I am very grateful to them for the prompt and to Branden for his comments on the
paper. It had its next outing at the Eastern APA in January 2020, and I thank the audience
there for very helpful comments. The referees from this journal also helped to improve the
paper considerably.
1
then you think we should believe every tautology (Smithies, 2015). Or, if
you are a Bayesian epistemologist, one of the central tenets of your creed
is Probabilism, and that demands we assign maximal credence—namely, 1,
or 100%—to all logical truths and minimal credence—namely, 0, or 0%—to
all logical falsehoods; and it demands that we assign at most as much cre-
dence to something as to its logical consequences (Hacking, 1967; Jeffrey,
1992; Garber, 1983; Earman, 1992).1 In this paper, I’ll focus primarily on
the logical omniscience that Bayesianism demands of our credences; but
I’ll briefly consider the case of belief in my conclusion.
Now, at least in the Bayesian case, we do not simply demand logical
omniscience on a whim; we have our reasons. For one thing, in many
standard applications of the Bayesian machinery, the assumption is nat-
ural. Suppose, for instance, we’re trying to use it to decide between two
hypotheses about the chance with which a coin will land heads when it is
tossed. There’s a fixed, easily surveyable set of hypotheses; there is a fixed,
easily enumerable set of possible bodies of evidence we might obtain after
observing the coin toss for, say, twenty tosses; and the logical relationships
between the pieces of evidence, between the hypotheses, and between the
evidence and the hypotheses are pretty transparent to someone who un-
derstands the setup. In this case, logical omniscience tells us that we must
be certain that, if the coin didn’t land heads on the first toss, it landed tails;
it tells us to be at least as confident that it landed heads on the first toss as
we are that it landed heads on the first two tosses; and so on. In these cases,
logical omniscience seems a reasonable requirement. And it was such cases
where Bayesianism first found application.
More generally, and indeed with greater normative force, we are led
to demand logical omniscience by the best available arguments for credal
norms, namely, the Dutch Book Argument, due to Frank P. Ramsey and
Bruno de Finetti, and the Accuracy Dominance Argument, due to James
Joyce (Ramsey, 1926 [1931]; de Finetti, 1937 [1980]; Joyce, 1998). The former
claims that my credences are irrational if they’re incoherent (or Dutchbook-
able), and they’re incoherent (or Dutchbookable) if there’s a series of bets,
each of which my credences require me to accept, but which, when taken
together, are guaranteed to lose me money. It then argues that, if I am not
logically omniscient, I’m incoherent in this sense, and therefore irrational.
The latter says that my credences are irrational if they’re accuracy dominated,
and they’re accuracy dominated if there are alternative credences over the
same propositions that are guaranteed to be strictly more accurate than
mine. It then argues that, if I am not logically omniscient, I’m accuracy
dominated in this sense, and therefore irrational.
1Probabilism says that (i) your credence in a logical truth should be 1 (c(>) = 1), (ii)
your credence in a logical falsehood should be 0 (c(⊥) = 0), and (iii) your credence in a
disjunction should be the sum of your credences in the disjuncts less your credence in their
conjunction (c(A ∨ B) = c(A) + c(B)− c(A & B)).
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So the simplest uses of Bayesian epistemology, and the uses to which
it was originally put in the philosophy of science, make the requirement of
logical omniscience seem reasonable; and, what’s more, our best arguments
concerning credal norms justify it. However, our intuitive judgments about
rationality are at odds with this prescription. Consider a first year logic stu-
dent who has just learned the method of truth tables, and who is asked to
determine the status of Peirce’s Law, namely, (((p → q) → p) → p). They
have learned enough logic to understand the truth functional properties of
the material conditional, and they recognise what the well-formed formula
just stated says. But they are surely not irrational if they are less than cer-
tain of that formula when they begin to draw up its truth table; and they
are surely not irrational if they become steadily more and more certain of it
as they secure a ‘T’ in the final column of each of the four rows.
Bayesianism is a well supported, successful, and pleasingly general
theory of rational credence. How should we reconcile it with the ver-
dicts of our intuitions about the rationality of logical uncertainty, which
are widely held and resilient? Some philosophers respond to the tension
by siding with logical omniscience, at least as a requirement of ideal ratio-
nality (Smithies, 2015). Others accept that Bayesianism has over played its
hand here, and they try to weaken it in a way that preserves those features
that have made it so successful (Hacking, 1967; Jeffrey, 1992; Garber, 1983;
Gaifman, 2004). I’ll follow the second route. I will adopt and expand Ian
Hacking’s approach to this issue (Hacking, 1967). Hacking applied his ap-
proach primarily to synchronic credal norms; I will expand it to diachronic
norms as well; and I will explain how we might appeal to an application of
Good’s Value of Information Theorem (Good, 1967) in order to say when
it is appropriate to criticize an individual for their logical ignorance, and
to recover what is right about the demand for logical omniscience as a re-
quirement of ideal rationality.
1 Hacking’s insight
As noted above, the first obstacles for someone who wishes to reject the
demand of logical omniscience are the Dutch Book Argument and the Ac-
curacy Dominance Argument, each of which is usually taken to establish
Probabilism and with it logical omniscience. In this section, we draw on
an insight due originally to Ian Hacking (1967) to show that, when cor-
rectly understood, both arguments in fact establish a weaker norm, Per-
sonal Probabilism, which only entails standard Probabilism, and thus log-
ical omniscience, in certain situations. This alternative norm matches our
intuitive judgments about credal rationality much better.
Hacking originally explored his insight in the case of the Dutch Book
Argument. Daniel Garber (1983) then elaborated on it and described some
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of its consequences. Robbie Williams (2018) then applied the insight to
the accuracy argument in a related but slightly different context from ours,
namely, the case in which you are uncertain which logic governs the propo-
sitions to which you assign credences, but you are certain what follows
from what according to the consequence relations of each logic you con-
sider possible. Here, we will mainly be interested in the case in which you
are certain that classical logic is correct, but you are not certain about what
follows from what according to its consequence relation.
To understand Hacking’s insight, note that the Dutch Book Argument
and the Accuracy Dominance Argument are both based on what we might
call dominance reasoning. In the Dutch Book Argument, we show that, if
your credences violate Probabilism, they require you to make a dominated
series of choices; that is, they require you to make each of a series of choices
where there is an alternative series of choices you could have made instead
that would leave you better off at all possible worlds: in particular, you
must choose to accept each of a series of bets where refusing each bet would
leave you better off. In the Accuracy Dominance Argument, we show that,
if your credences violate Probabilism, they are accuracy dominated; that
is, there is an alternative set of credences that is more accurate than yours
at all possible worlds. Thus, in both arguments, we have to specify which
possible worlds we mean to include among those at which the utility of the
outcomes of the actions in the Dutch Book Argument and the accuracy of
credences in the Accuracy Dominance Argument will be evaluated.
In what follows, we’ll assume that classical logic is the correct logic and
we’ll say of a world that it is logically possible world if it is possible by
the lights of classical propositional logic. Now, Hacking noted of the Dutch
Book Argument that, if it is to establish Probabilism, it must assume that
the possible worlds include at most those that are logically possible. And,
if we wish to prove the Converse Dutch Book Theorem, which is intended
to establish that no credence function that satisfies Probabilism is incoher-
ent, then we need to include at least those logically possible worlds. Thus,
in the Dutch Book Argument, we typically take them to be exactly the log-
ically possible worlds. And the same is true of the Accuracy Dominance
Argument. In both cases, we can secure a credal norm that does not de-
mand logical omniscience if we permit more than just the logically possible
worlds.
This was Hacking’s insight. It immediately raises the question: Which
worlds should be included? Which are the dominance-relevant worlds? That
is, what is the smallest set of worlds, W , for which dominance reasoning
holds? That is, for which W is it the case that you are irrational if you
choose one option when there is an alternative option you might have cho-
sen that is better than your option at all worlds in W? The Dutch Book
Argument and the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism work
only if W contains only logically possible worlds. Is that a reasonable as-
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sumption? In the remainder of this section, I’ll argue that it is not.
Let’s begin by supposing I tell you that the only dominance-relevant
world is the actual world. That is, I claim that you are irrational if you
choose an option when there’s an alternative that is, as a matter of actual
fact, better than yours. This immediately strikes you as wrong. You think
I must be mixing up the best thing to do with the rational thing to do. It
is surely possible to be rational and yet choose an option that is, as a mat-
ter of actual fact, not the best. I take your point. So I expand the set of
dominance-relevant worlds to include not only the actual world, but also
all the metaphysically possible worlds as well. That is, I now claim you
are irrational if you choose an option when there’s an alternative that is,
as a matter of metaphysical necessity, better than yours. This seems less
problematic, but still wrong. After all, I don’t know all the a posteriori but
metaphysically necessary truths; that is, I don’t know which are the meta-
physically possible worlds; that is, I don’t have sufficient evidence to pin
them down; I don’t have sufficient evidence to rule out all the metaphys-
ically impossible worlds. So surely I can’t be irrational simply because I
choose something that is dominated relative to this set of worlds.
In both cases, our judgments about the account of the dominance-relevant
worlds seem to be based on the following very rough account of rationality.
To be rational is to do the best that you can within the bounds of your lim-
ited resources and as judged from your limited perspective. If you choose
one option when there is another that is actually better, it is possible to
see from an alternative, better informed perspective that you are not doing
as well as you might; but if it isn’t possible to see this from your limited
perspective, you are not irrational. And similarly if you choose an option
where there is another that is better at all metaphysically possible worlds.
Again, from a better informed perspective, we can see that there is some-
thing that is guaranteed to be better than your choice; but if you can’t see
that from your more limited perspective, you aren’t irrational for choosing
as you do.
This suggests the notion of possibility that Hacking introduces, namely,
personal possibility.2 Roughly speaking, a world is personally possible for
a particular individual at a particular time if by this time this individ-
ual hasn’t ruled it out by their experiences, their logical reasoning, their
conceptual thinking, their insights, their emotional reactions, or whatever
other cognitive activities and processes can rule out worlds for an individ-
ual. For instance, if I learn from a visual experience that there’s a goat in
front of me, this rules out all worlds at which there isn’t. If I learn by testi-
mony that South Africa won the 2019 Rugby World Cup, then that rules out
2Robbie Williams (2018, 132) takes up the same idea under the name doxastic possibility.
He leaves it as a primitive, undefined concept. Hacking himself comes to identify personal
possibilities with epistemic possibilities (Hacking, 1967, Section 6). We’ll have more to say
about this below.
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all worlds at which England won it, providing I’ve already learned that no
more than one team can win and that South Africa is a different team from
England, and thereby already ruled out worlds at which England won too.
If I learn by philosophical reasoning and reflection that the Law of the Ex-
cluded Middle is true, and I know that Y is the disjunction of X and the
negation of X, that rules out all worlds at which Y is false. If I learn an
instance of Peirce’s Law by the method of truth tables, that rules out all
worlds at which that instance is false. And so on.
Pace Williams and Hacking, we should distinguish personally possible
worlds from doxastically or epistemically possible ones. A world is doxas-
tically possible if it makes true everything you believe, while it is epistemi-
cally possible if it makes true everything you know. In both cases, we need
to posit categorical doxastic attitudes, such as belief and knowledge, to de-
fine the notion. Yet one might be sceptical about these. And in any case
our approach does not depend on their existence. A world is personally
possible not if it makes true all you know or believe, but rather if it hasn’t
been ruled out by your cognitive activities and processes.3
According to Hacking (and to Williams and to me), the dominance-
relevant worlds are precisely those that are personally possible for the in-
dividual in question at the time in question. If you choose option a, and
yet b is better at all metaphysically possible worlds, you aren’t necessar-
ily irrational, for you might not have enough evidence to rule out certain
metaphysically impossible worlds—if you don’t know Stokely Carmichael
was Kwame Ture, then you might not have ruled out a world at which
Carmichael was a prote´ge´ of Ella Baker, but Ture wasn’t. And, similarly, if b
is better at all logically possible worlds, you aren’t necessarily irrational, for
you might not have reasoned hard enough or long enough to rule out cer-
tain logically impossible worlds—you might never have ruled out a world
in which the axioms of arithmetic are true, but there are just finitely many
primes. However, if b is better at all personally possible worlds, then it is ir-
rational to choose a. After all, a is worse not only from some external, better
informed point of view; it’s also better from your own limited perspective.
And that’s what it means to be irrational.
I conclude this section by considering two questions that arise. First:
What exactly are these logically impossible worlds that I wish to include
among our personal possibilities? Like Graham Priest (1997), it seems to
me that we might extend any of the standard metaphysical accounts of log-
ically possible worlds to the realm of the logically impossible: for instance,
Yagisawa (1988) extends Lewis’ modal realism in this way, positing con-
crete logically impossible worlds; Jago (2012) constructs ersatz impossible
worlds out of positive and negative facts; it’s easy to see how to extend
3These personally possible worlds share much in common with Graham Priest’s open
worlds (Priest, 2005).
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the linguistic ersatzism view that possible worlds are sentences in natural
language or interpreted formal languages; and so on. For my purposes
here, I remain agnostic about the metaphysics of these worlds. I do this
not because I have no view on the matter, but because the account I give
does not depend on which view we adopt—it will work just as well for any
account with a handful of minimal features, which I will now enumerate.
First, I need that, for any personal possibility and anything to which I might
assign a credence, the possibility determines whether the object of the cre-
dence is true or false. Now, just as there are many accounts of the meta-
physics of personal possibilities, so there are many accounts of the objects
of credence. Chalmers (2011) enumerates a few. He rejects Russellian struc-
tured propositions and sets of metaphysically possible worlds because of a
credal version of Frege’s puzzle. He rejects sentences in natural language,
because he takes it to be possible to have contentful thoughts while lack-
ing linguistic ability. He considers sentences in the language of thought,
Fregean thoughts, and pairs consisting of Russellian propositions together
with a guise under which that proposition is apprehended in thought. He
favours sets of centred worlds. As for the metaphysics of personal possi-
bilities, I remain agnostic about the metaphysics of the objects of our cre-
dences.4 All that I need is that the objects of credence are the sorts of things
made true or false by the personal possibilities. More precisely, in order to
get our framework up and running, I need:
(i) for each individual and each time, a set W of worlds that are the
personal possibilities for that individual at that time;
(ii) for each individual and each time, a set F of credal objects to which
that individual assigns credences at that time;
(iii) for each X in F and w inW , X is true or false at w;
(iv) it is not necessary that, for every subset S ⊆ W , there is X in F that
is true at all and only the worlds in S .
Any metaphysical account of personal possibilities and credal objects that
satisfies (i)-(iv) can serve our purpose.
The second question I wish to consider before we move on: How do
we rule out particular personally possible worlds? I gave some examples
above: we have perceptual experiences and emotional reactions and in-
sights; we undertake logical reasoning and conceptual thinking. Each of
these is a cognitive process or activity. When does an individual rule out a
particular personally possible world by using such a process or activity? I
won’t have much to say about this here. Rather, I’ll take the standard ap-
proach of the Bayesian, who is usually not so interested in what Jonathan
4However, it is worth noting that Chalmers’ centred worlds won’t work for us, since
they are all logically if not metaphysically possible.
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Weisberg (2009) calls the input problem, namely, how the agent acquires the
new information she does, and focusses instead on the norms that gov-
ern how they should respond to that information. I’ll assume only that
these inputs, whatever they are and however they are delivered to you,
serve to eliminate personally possible worlds. That is, after these learning
episodes, your set of personally possible worlds shrinks. Thus, on this pic-
ture, while the inputs that give rise to logical and empirical learning might
be different—following a deductive inference or using a test for satisfiabil-
ity in one case, observing the world around you or dredging up a memory
of a past observation in the other—the effect they have on you is of the
same sort. In each case, learning helps you whittle down the personal pos-
sibilities, allowing you to home in on the actual world.
You might fill out the details of this account in a number of different
ways. For instance, you might say that a cognitive process terminates in a
set of personally possible worlds—a logical deduction terminates in the set
of personally possible worlds at which its conclusion is true; a perceptual
experience terminates in the set of personally possible worlds at which you
have that perceptual experience; and so on. Then you might say that a
cognitive process is reliable if it tends to result in sets of personally possible
worlds that contain the actual world. And finally, you might say that I have
ruled out a personally possible world by using a cognitive process if (i) that
process is reliable and (ii) the world in question isn’t in the set of personally
possible worlds that the process produces. But this is just one way. What I
say in the remainder of the paper does not rely on this.
2 The Dutch Book Argument
So the Dutch Book and the Accuracy Dominance Arguments for Probabil-
ism both rely on dominance reasoning. This means that, in order to draw
specific conclusions from them, we need to specify W , the dominance-
relevant set of worlds. Here, I’ll walk through the structure of both ar-
guments, but I’ll leave W as a variable we can specify later. As we’ll see,
we get different conclusions for different specifications ofW .
The Dutch Book Argument begins with a claim about which bets your
credences require you to accept.5
Favourable Bets If you have credence p in X, you are required
to pay any amount less than $pS for a bet that pays $S if X is
true and $0 if X is false.
5Dutch Book arguments have attracted many objections over the years. For presenta-
tions of the arguments and the objections, see (Ha´jek, 2008; Vineberg, 2016; Pettigrew, 2020).
I present arguments of this sort here not because I endorse them but because they are one
of the main sources of pressure to accept logical omniscience.
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Such a bet is called a $S-bet on X, and $S is the stake. Thus, Favourable Bets
says that, if you are 70% confident that it will rain tomorrow, then your
credence requires you to pay $5 or $6.49 or any amount less than $7 for a
$10-bet on rain tomorrow. In this example, the stake of the bet is $10.
Now suppose your credence function is c, which is defined on F , the
set of credal objects you entertain. Then we say c is incoherent over W if
there is a series of bets on the credal objects in F such that (i) the credences
that c assigns require you to accept each of those bets individually and (ii)
taken together, those bets lose you money at every world in W . Thus, if
c is incoherent overW , then c requires you to make a dominated series of
choices. It requires you to accept each bet in the series, but refusing each
of them would leave you better off. Thus, c requires you to do something
irrational. So, if we count credences as irrational that require you to make
an irrational series of choices, then credence functions that are incoherent
overW are irrational.
It just remains to identify which credence functions are incoherent over
W . To do this, we turn to a theorem due to de Finetti (1974). To state it, we
need some new terminology.
• Suppose w is a possible world in W . Then define the function vw :
F → {0, 1} as follows:
vw(X) =
{
1 if X is true at w
0 if X is false at w
We call vw the valuation function for w on F .
• LetWF be the set of valuation functions for the worlds inW defined
on F . That is,
WF = {vw : F → {0, 1} |w ∈ W}
• LetW+F be the convex hull ofWF . That is,
(i) W+F is convex, so that whenever c and c′ are in W+F , so is λc +
(1− λ)c′ for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
(ii) WF is a subset ofW+F , and
(iii) W+F is the smallest set for which (i) and (ii) hold.
Now we can state the theorem:
Theorem 1 (de Finetti) A credence function c on F is incoherent over W iff c
is not inW+F .
Now, ifW is just the classically possible worlds, then a further theorem due
to de Finetti gives us Probabilism:
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Theorem 2 (de Finetti) IfW is the set of classically possible worlds, then c is in
W+F iff c satisfies Probabilism.
Thus, if the dominance-relevant worlds are exactly the logically possible
worlds, then the incoherent credence functions are exactly those that vio-
late Probabilism, and we can derive that norm. But if they extend beyond
that, we cannot. Instead, in the general case, we derive the norm of Per-
sonal Probabilism.
Personal Probabilism If c is your credence function andW is
the set of personally possible worlds for you, then it ought to be
that c is inW+F .
We’ll explore some of the consequences of this norm in particular cases
below.
2.1 The Accuracy Dominance Argument
While the Dutch Book Argument judges a non-probabilistic credence func-
tion irrational because it requires you to make a dominated series of choices,
the Accuracy Dominance Argument judges it irrational because it is itself
dominated relative to a particular measure of epistemic goodness, namely,
accuracy. That is, there is an alternative credence function that is more ac-
curate at all worlds.
At the heart of the argument are the measures of inaccuracy. These take
a credence function and a possible world and they measure how inaccu-
rate that credence function is at that world. There are a number of different
ways of specifying which measures of inaccuracy are legitimate. For the
sake of concreteness, let’s focus on the so-called additive continuous strictly
proper inaccuracy measures, though what I say will apply to other classes as
well (Joyce, 2009; Predd et al., 2009; Pettigrew, 2016). I’ll briefly define these
here, but the details aren’t essential to the rest of the discussion. A scoring
rule is a function s that takes a truth value, represented by 1 or 0, and a
credence p and returns a measure, s(1, p) or s(0, p), of the inaccuracy of
having credence p in a credal object with that truth value. A scoring rule is
continuous if s(1, x) and s(0, x) are both continuous functions of x. A scor-
ing rule is strictly proper if each credence expects itself to have lowest inac-
curacy by the lights of that scoring rule: that is, if ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x)
is minimized uniquely, as a function of x, at x = p. An inaccuracy mea-
sure I is an additive continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure if there is a
continuous strictly proper scoring s, and the inaccuracy that I assigns to
a credence function c at a world w is the sum of the scores given by s at
w to the credences that c assigns: that is, I(c, w) = ∑X∈F s(vw(X), c(X)),
where vw is the valuation function for w that we defined above. Thus, a
central premise in the version of the Accuracy Dominance Argument we’re
spelling out here is this:
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Propriety Any legitimate measure of inaccuracy is an additive
continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure.
Now, according to the Accuracy Dominance Argument, a credence func-
tion c on F is irrational if it is accuracy dominated over W relative to all
legitimate inaccuracy measures, and it is accuracy dominated overW rela-
tive to an inaccuracy measure I if there is an alternative credence function
c? that is less inaccurate at every world in W , when inaccuracy is mea-
sured by I. That is, c is irrational if there is c?, also defined on F , such that
I(c?, w) < I(c, w) for all w inW .
It just remains to identify which credence functions are accuracy dom-
inated overW . To do this, we turn to a theorem due to Predd et al. (2009)
that generalizes another theorem due to de Finetti (1974).
Theorem 3 (Predd, et al.) Suppose I is an additive continuous strictly proper
inaccuracy measure. Then a credence function c on F is accuracy dominated over
W relative to I iff c is not inW+F .
Thus, again, ifW is the set of logically possible worlds, then we can appeal
to Theorem 2 to derive Probabilism; and if not we can still derive Personal
Probabilism.
2.2 Personal Probabilism
What does Personal Probabilism demand? This depends, of course, on the
set of worlds that are personally possible for you. Let’s illustrate with an ex-
ample. Above, we briefly saw David Chalmers arguing that, if we take sen-
tences in the subject’s language to be the objects of credence, we fail to give
a fully general theory, since we can ascribe credences even to subjects with
no linguistic ability. However, for those with linguistic ability, sentences in
their language are a decent proxy for whatever we do end up taking the
objects of credence to be—they can be paired reasonably straightforwardly
with the true objects of credence. In this example, then, we’ll assume that
the objects of your credences are indeed paired up with sentences. In fact,
throughout, we’ll suppose you have credences only in three sentences, A,
B, and C. And we suppose that C is in fact the disjunction of A and B: that
is, C is A ∨ B.
At first, we assume you don’t know that C is A ∨ B. Indeed, you know
nothing of the logical connections between the three sentences A, B, and C.
This might be because you haven’t yet attended to their logical forms. As a
result, for you, there are eight personally possible worlds, namely, the eight
different ways to assign truth values to A, B, and C (shown on the left of the
table), and these correspond to eight different valuation functions (shown
on the right).
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W A B C (= A ∨ B) WF A B C (= A ∨ B)
w1 T T T vw1 1 1 1
w2 T T F vw2 1 1 0
w3 T F T vw3 1 0 1
w4 T F F vw4 1 0 0
w5 F T T vw5 0 1 1
w6 F T F vw6 0 1 0
w7 F F T vw7 0 0 1
w8 F F F vw8 0 0 0
It turns out that, when W = {w1, . . . , w8} is your set of personally possi-
ble worlds, no credence function is incoherent or accuracy-dominated; all
are rationally permitted. That is because each possible assignment of cre-
dences is some convex combination of the valuation functions in WF ; so
each credence function is inW+F , and therefore, by Theorems 1 and 3, it is
neither incoherent nor accuracy dominated. So, in particular, a credence
function that assigns lower credence to the disjunction A ∨ B than to either
of its disjuncts A and B is not incoherent and its not accuracy dominated.
Next, let’s suppose you learn that C is the disjunction of A and B. But
how? After all, you don’t assign any credence to a sentence, C = (A ∨
B), that states that identity. But not all learning must happen like that.
Learning the truth of a sentence that you already entertain is just one way
of learning. In general, you learn when you rule out particular worlds that
were previously personally possible for you; that is, learning restricts the
set of worlds that are personally possible for you. In particular, in this case,
what you learned rules out worlds w2, w4, w6, and w7, and leaves worlds
w1, w3, w5, and w8 as still personally possible for you. So after this learning
episode, your set of personally possible worlds is W ′ = {w1, w3, w5, w8}.
Now, it’s straightforward to show that the credence functions that satisfy
Personal Probabilism whenW ′ is the set of your personally possible worlds
are exactly those c such that c(A), c(B) ≤ c(A ∨ B) ≤ c(A) + c(B).
Now, suppose that, later still, you learn that A and B are incompatible.
That is, what you learn rules out world w1, leaving w3, w5, and w8 as your
personally possible worlds. So W ′′F = {w3, w5, w8}. Then the credence
functions that are neither incoherent nor accuracy dominated are now those
that satisfy c(A) + c(B) = c(A ∨ B).
As Hacking notes, in general, we can recover something of standard
Probabilism from Personal Probabilism (Hacking, 1967, Section 10):
• if you learn that > is a logical truth—that is, if it is true in all person-
ally possible worlds—then Personal Probabilism requires c(>) = 1,
which is also what Probabilism requires;
• if you learn that ⊥ is a logical falsehood—so that it is false at all per-
sonally possible worlds—then Personal Probabilism requires c(⊥) =
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0, which is also what Probabilism requires;
• if you learn that A ∨ B is the disjunction of A and B, and A & B is
their conjunction, then Personal Probabilism requires
c(A ∨ B) = c(A) + c(B)− c(A & B)
which is also what Probabilism requires.
Sinan Dogramaci (2018) worries about norms like Personal Probabil-
ism. If Logicality is the traditional Bayesian requirement to be certain of
any logical truth, let Personal Logicality be the requirement to be certain of
any credal object that is true at all of your personally possible worlds. This
is a consequence of Personal Probabilism. But Dogramaci worries that it’s
vacuous: “any proposition, as far as I can see, could be such that it might
be false for you or me or whoever, and we have to say there is nothing ir-
rational about it” (Dogramaci, 2018, 118). I think this commits a quantifier
shift fallacy. Dogramaci is right that there is no credal object >, such that,
for all individuals, they are rationally required to be certain of >. But that
is not sufficient to show that Personal Logicality is vacuous. That would
require that, for any individual and any credal object X, they are not re-
quired to be certain of X. But Dogramaci hasn’t shown that. And indeed,
it’s false on the view I’m developing. Consider the following credal object:
(p → q) → (¬q → ¬p). I have taught logic many times; I have derived
this formula in a number of different proof systems and I have verified via
the method of truth tables that it is guaranteed to be true. I have, therefore,
ruled out all personally possible worlds at which it is false. As a result,
Personal Logicality demands that I am certain that (p→ q)→ (¬q→ ¬p).
Nonetheless, it is possible for me to violate that norm. Suppose, for in-
stance, that normally the cognitive process of deductive reasoning, which
terminates in a set of personally possible worlds, also causes me to become
certain of any credal object that is true at all of those worlds. However,
sometimes, that causal pathway is interrupted; sometimes it malfunctions
and gives me a credence of 0.5 instead. In such a case, I would violate Per-
sonal Logicality. In general, the point is that, while the process by which
you rule out personally possible worlds will have close causal connections
with the process by which you set your credences, they are nonetheless sep-
arate processes and thus can come apart. And when they do, that creates
the possibility that you might assign credence less than 1 to a credal object
that is true at all personally possible worlds that you haven’t ruled out.
3 Logical learning
In the previous section, we rehearsed the synchronic or static credal norms
that we obtain if we run the Dutch Book Argument and Accuracy Dom-
inance Argument using personally possible worlds rather than logically
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possible ones: we justify Personal Probabilism. We saw how learning more
and thereby ruling out more personally possible worlds gave rise to in-
creasingly strong synchronic norms. But we didn’t discuss how we should
update from the prior credences we have before we learn to our new pos-
terior credences after we learn. We turn to that question in this section.
3.1 The two ways to learn
Now, there are two ways a learning episode can narrow down your set
of personally possible worlds. The first is the most standard, and it is the
one that Garber (1983) considers in his treatment of the problem of old ev-
idence. In these episodes, we learn something with certainty that we have
previously considered and to which we already assign a credence. That is,
we learn of some credal object in F that it is true. For instance, I might have
an intermediate credence in a particular instance of Peirce’s Law, and then
I might come to learn it with certainty on the basis of my logic tutor’s testi-
mony. Or we might learn a logical relationship, such as that the hypothesis
H entails the evidence E, where I have a credence in the proposition H |= E
that I have thereby learned. In these cases, the diachronic story is simple:
we have good pragmatic and epistemic arguments for updating by con-
ditionalizing. David Lewis shows that, if you plan to update in any way
other than by conditionalizing, there is a Dutch strategy against you—that
is, a set of bets you’ll accept before you learn anything, and another set of
bets that you’ll accept whatever you learn, and together these bets lose you
money at all dominance-relevant possible worlds (Lewis, 1999). Peter M.
Brown shows that, if you know you’ll make a decision after receiving some
evidence and you’re planning how you should respond to that evidence
so that you’ll currently expect your future decision to be best, then you
should update by conditionalization (Brown, 1976). Hilary Greaves and
David Wallace show that, if you are planning how to update in response
to new evidence you’ll get, you expect conditionalization to be the most
accurate method by which to do it (Greaves & Wallace, 2006). And Ray
Briggs and I show that, if you assess the accuracy of your prior and your
planned posteriors together, summing their individual accuracies, the only
pairs that aren’t accuracy dominated are those where your planned poste-
riors are the result of conditionalizing your prior on your evidence (Briggs
& Pettigrew, 2018).
On the second way of learning, the learning episode directly eliminates
personally possible worlds. It doesn’t do so by teaching you that some
credal object you entertain is true. Rather, it teaches you directly that some
personally possible worlds are not actual. This is the sort of learning that
took place in the move fromW toW ′ and fromW ′ toW ′′ above. This sort
of learning is much less often considered. One exception is the so-called
‘superconditioning’ treatment of the sort of empirical learning experience
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for which Richard Jeffrey formulated his Probability Kinematics.6 Jeffrey
was interested in cases in which you have a particular perceptual experi-
ence but there is no proposition that you entertain and to which you previ-
ously assigned a credence that completely captures what you learn through
that experience. Jeffrey suggests that, in such a case, you do not learn a
proposition; rather, your evidence places some constraints on certain of
your posterior credences. Probability Kinematics is then the updating rule
you should follow to determine how to update the remaining credences to
make them cohere with the ones fixed by the evidential constraints. Van
Fraassen showed that you can similarly consider this as a case in which
there is a proposition that you learn, but it’s not one to which you initially
assigned a credence: under certain conditions, including van Fraassen’s
own Reflection Principle, this approach and Jeffrey’s are equivalent. Thus,
on this view, the sort of empirical learning that Jeffrey wishes to treat with
his Probability Kinematics is analogous to the sort of logical learning that
we consider: both rule out possible worlds, but not necessarily by teaching
you a proposition you previously entertained.
How should we respond to such learning? Neither Brown’s pragmatic
argument, nor Greaves and Wallace’s accuracy argument will help us here,
since they require you to assess the expected value of something from the
point of view of your prior credences. But, in the case in question, the
prior isn’t defined on all of the personal possibilities that are required to
define that expected value. For instance, to calculate an updating plan
you might execute in the move fromW toW ′, you’d need to assign prior
credences to w1, . . . , w8. But you don’t. You assign credences only to A,
which corresponds to the set {w1, w2, w3, w4} of personally possible worlds,
B, which corresponds to {w1, w2, w5, w6}, and C, which corresponds to
{w1, w3, w5, w7}. However, Lewis’ pragmatic argument and the accuracy
argument that Briggs and I offer do apply. We’ll see the updating norms
they entail below.
3.2 Why we need both ways
Before that, however, I’d like to explain why both sorts of learning are es-
sential to a comprehensive account of logical learning. It is because nei-
ther can account for all the important cases on their own. First, take Gar-
ber’s central case, where you learn a fact about logical entailment, such
as H |= E. Garber wishes to claim that, in many cases, old evidence can
6Jeffrey formulates Probability Kinematics in (Jeffrey, 1965). Bas van Fraassen (1980)
and Brian Skyrms (1987) both show that Jeffrey’s rule can be recovered as a form of su-
perconditioning, providing you obey the Reflection Principle, as well as a condition called
Sufficiency; Diaconis & Zabell (1982, Theorem 2.1) provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for superconditioning. See (Konek, 2019) and (Wilson, ms) for more recent treatments
of Jeffrey’s Probability Kinematics and its relationship to superconditioning.
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nonetheless support a new hypothesis if what the scientist learns is not the
old evidence, but rather the logical relationship between the hypothesis
and the evidence. Suppose our scientist has only credences in H and E—in
Garber’s example, following Glymour (1980, 85-6), H is Einstein’s gravita-
tional field equations, and E is the anomalous advance of the perihelion of
Mercury. So, F = {H, E} and the personally possible worlds are given in
the following table:
H E
w1 T T
w2 T F
w3 F T
w4 F F
Now, suppose we try to model learning H |= E as eliminating world w2
at which H is true and E false. Then that will not capture the full strength
of H |= E, since a logical consequence claim is a modal claim. It does not
reduce to the material implication H → E, but learning that eliminates pre-
cisely w2. What’s more, this representation will not serve Garber’s needs.
Suppose that, like Einstein himself, I’m certain of E, because it is old evi-
dence. Then my credence in w2 is already 0. Thus, eliminating personally
possible world w2 will not lead me to update my credences at all, and in
particular won’t lead me to raise my credence in H. On the other hand, if
I include H |= E in F , then it’s quite possible that, by learning that logi-
cal fact, I can change my credence in H. For now the personally possible
worlds are given in the following table:
H E H |= E
w1 T T T
w2 T T F
w3 T F T
w4 T F F
w5 F T T
w6 F T F
w7 F F T
w8 F F F
Even if we follow Garber and eliminate w3 because it is incompatible with
the meaning of the consequence relation, and even if we eliminate w4, w7,
and w8 as well because E is false at those worlds, we are still left w1, w2, w5,
and w6 as personally possible worlds. And there are priors that are mix-
tures of their valuation functions and such that conditionalizing on H |= E
raises your credence in H, as Garber requires.
Next, consider someone who has credences in H, E, and H |= E, but
doesn’t yet realise what H |= E means. That is, she doesn’t know how
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it relates to its component parts, H and E (just as, in our example above,
you didn’t realise how A ∨ B related to A and to B). Then there is nothing
she entertains now that she might learn with certainty that we can count
as her learning the meaning of H |= E. To do that, she must eliminate w3
and nothing more. But there is no credal object in her set F = {H, E, H |=
E} that is false and w3 and only at w3. Of course, you might retort that
H & E & H |= E is false at w3 and only at w3. And while that is true, if we
were to introduce that credal object into F , the set of personally possible
worlds would expand, and you’d first have to learn what H & E & H |= E
says before you can know that learning it with certainty will rule out ex-
actly world w3. And so the problem arises again: there is nothing you enter-
tain that is true only at personally possible worlds at which H & E & H |= E
is related to its component parts in the requisite way. The upshot is that
we need to be able to have learning experiences that rule out personally
possible worlds directly, rather than by teaching you with certainty some-
thing you currently entertain, and thereby ruling out all personally possible
worlds at which it is false.
3.3 How to update after you learn
In the previous section, we modelled learning as a process of whittling
down your set of personally possible worlds, and we noted that this might
happen when you learn the truth of something that you already have an
opinion about; but it might also happen when your learning directly rules
out personally possible worlds even though you couldn’t articulate what
you’d learned using those credal objects to which you assign credences. In
this section, we ask how we should respond when we learn in these differ-
ent ways.
Bayesian norms of updating are often stated as if they govern only ac-
tual updating behaviour. That is, we talk as if the norm tells you how you
should update on the evidence you actually receive. However, the best ar-
guments for those norms instead govern not only how you actually update
on the evidence you actually receive, but also how you would update were
you to receive different evidence. That is, these arguments establish norms
that govern not only your actual updating behaviour, but your updating
plans or intentions or dispositions. To specify your updating plan at a par-
ticular time, we first specify a partition E = {E1, . . . , Ek} of the set of your
personally possible worlds at this time; this includes the pieces of evidence
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you might obtain by some specific later time.7 Thus, if you’ve just asked a
yes/no question, E might partition the worlds into those where you receive
a positive answer, those where you hear a negative, and those where the re-
spondent tells you they don’t know. Or, if you’re about to check the time on
a digital 24-hour clock showing hours and minutes, E will be the 1,440-cell
partition of the worlds into those in which the clock shows ‘00:00’, those
in which it shows ‘00:01’, and so on. An updating rule c′ is then a func-
tion that takes each Ei in E and returns a credence function c′i, which is the
posterior that the rule endorses as a response to Ei.
In the Dutch Book argument for Personal Probabilism, we show that a
credence function c is irrational by showing that c is synchronically incoher-
ent: that is, there is a book B of bets, each of which c requires you to accept,
such that the bets in B taken together will lose money at all personally pos-
sible worlds. In the Dutch Book argument for an updating norm, we show
that a prior credence function c together with an updating rule c′ on a par-
tition E = {E1, . . . , Ek} is irrational by showing that (c, c′) is diachronically
incoherent: that is,
(i) there is a book B of bets, each of which c requires you to accept, and
(ii) for each Ei in E , there is a book Bi of bets, each of which c′i requires
you to accept,
such that
(a) for any Ei in E and any personally possible world w in Ei, the bets in
B and in Bi taken together lose you money at w.
Now, the question is: which prior-rule pairings are diachronically in-
coherent? In the standard diachronic Dutch Book argument for Bayesian
conditionalization, this is usually asked when, for each Ei in E , there is a
Xi in F such that Xi is true at precisely the personally possible worlds in
Ei. In this case, we say that Xi represents Ei; and when each Ei in E is rep-
resented by a credal object in F , we say that E is represented in F . To state
our characterization of the prior-rule pairings that are diachronically inco-
herent when E is represented in F , we must say what it means for a rule c′
to be a conditionalizing rule for c.
Definition 1 Suppose that, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Xi in F represents Ei. c′ is
a conditionalizing rule for c if, for each Ei in E , if c(Xi) > 0, then c′i(−) =
c(−|Xi).
7We say that E = {E1, . . . , Ek} is a partition ofW iff
(i) each Ei is a subset ofW ;
(ii) together, they cover all ofW—that is, E1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ek =W ;
(iii) they are disjoint—that is, Ei ∩ Ej = ∅, for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k.
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Then we have:
Theorem 4 Suppose E is represented in F . Then (c, c′) is diachronically inco-
herent overW iff c′ is not a conditionalizing rule for c.
But we are also interested in cases in which, for some or even all Ei in E ,
there is no Xi inF such that Xi is true at precisely the worlds in Ei. That is, E
is not represented in F . To say which prior-rule pairings are diachronically
incoherent in this case, we must say what it means for a rule c′ to a be a
superconditioning rule for c.
Definition 2 c′ is a superconditioning rule for c if, for each w inW , there is
0 ≤ λw ≤ 1 such that ∑w∈W λw = 1 and
(i) c(−) = ∑w∈W λwvw(−), and
(ii) for Ei in E , if ∑w∈Ei λw > 0,
c′i(−) =
∑w∈Ei λwvw(−)
∑w∈Ei λw
Theorem 5 (c, c′) is diachronically incoherent overW iff c′ is not a supercondi-
tioning rule for c.
This furnishes us with an argument for the following norm:
Superconditionalization If c is your prior and c′ is your updat-
ing plan, then c′ should be a superconditioning rule for c.
To understand superconditioning rules, it’s best to see one in action.
Suppose, as above, that F = {A, B, A ∨ B}. And suppose that you know
that A ∨ B is the disjunction of A and B. Thus, your set of personally pos-
sible worlds isW ′F = {w1, w3, w5, w8}. Now, let’s suppose that you’re con-
structing a truth table that will teach you either E1 = {w1}, which says that
A and B are both true together, or E2 = {w3, w5, w8}, which says that they
are not both true together. Which updating rule c′ should you adopt for re-
sponding this new evidence? As we saw above, at the prior time, Personal
Probabilism demands only that c(A), c(B) ≤ c(A ∨ B) ≤ c(A) + c(B). At
the posterior time, if you learn E1, then that becomes your set of person-
ally possible worlds, and Personal Probabilism demands that your poste-
rior assigns c′1(A) = c
′
1(B) = c
′
1(A ∨ B) = 1; on the other hand, if you
learn E2, then that becomes your set of personally possible worlds, and
Personal Probabilism demands that c′2(A) + c′2(B) = c′2(A ∨ B). Now con-
sider the following prior-rule pair (c, c′); the prior satisfies the synchronic
constraints imposed by Personal Probabilism at the earlier time, and the
two possible posteriors both satisfy the synchronic constraints imposed at
the later time.
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A B A ∨ B
c 14
2
3
3
4
c′1 1 1 1
c′2
1
10
3
5
7
10
Then we can see that c′ is a superconditioning rule for c by setting the
weights as follows:
λw1 λw3 λw5 λw8
2
12
1
12
6
12
3
12
Then
(i) c(−) = 212 vw1 + 112 vw3 + 612 vw5 + 312 vw8
(ii) c′1(−) = 1vw1 + 0vw3 + 0vw5 + 0vw8
c′2(−) = 0vw1 + 110 vw3 + 610 vw5 + 310 vw8
as required.
Having seen superconditioning in action, let’s consider a diachronic
version of the Accuracy Dominance Argument, which also establishes that
norm. In the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Personal Probabilism, we
show that a credence function c is irrational by showing that c is accuracy
dominated: that is, there is an alternative c? that is more accurate than c at
all personally possible worlds. In the Accuracy Dominance Argument for
an updating norm, we show that a prior c together with a rule c′ defined
on a partition E of your personally possible worlds is irrational by showing
that the pair (c, c′) is accuracy dominated: that is, there is an alternative pair
(c?, c?′) such that, for each Ei in E and world w in Ei, the sum of the accu-
racy of c? at w and the accuracy of c?′i at w exceeds the sum of the accuracy
of c at w and the accuracy of c′i at w. That is, if I is an additive continuous
strictly proper inaccuracy measure, then the inaccuracy of the pair (c, c′) at
world w in Ei is I(c, w) + I(c′i, w). So, (c, c
′) is accuracy dominated relative
to I iff there is (c?, c?′) such that, for all Ei in E and w in Ei,
I(c?, w) + I(c?′i , w) < I(c, w) + I(c
′
i, w)
Now, the question is: which prior-rule pairings are accuracy dominated
relative to this way of measuring inaccuracy? Again, we have the case in
which E is represented in F :
Theorem 6 Suppose E is represented in F and I is a strictly proper inaccuracy
measure. Then (c, c′) is accuracy dominated over W relative to I iff c′ is not a
conditionalizing rule for c.
And we have the general case, where we don’t assume that:
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Theorem 7 Suppose I is a strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then (c, c′) is
accuracy dominated overW relative to I iff c′ is not a superconditioning rule for
c.
This completes our extension of Hacking’s project. Following his in-
sight that the dominance-relevant worlds should include not only the log-
ically possible worlds, but also the personally possible ones, we’ve shown
the effect of this observation on the synchronic Dutch Book and Accu-
racy Dominance Arguments for Probabilism, and now we’ve seen how to
update your credences in order to avoid diachronic incoherence and di-
achronic accuracy dominance. In the remainder of the paper, we turn to
objections to this approach.
4 Objections
We’ll consider two objections to the approach we’ve followed in this paper.
4.1 The threat of revenge
A common objection to the move from logically possible worlds to person-
ally possible worlds is that it only buys the Bayesian a little time. After all,
as we’ve seen, anyone with a credence function on F who satisfies our new
personal version of Probabilism will have a credence function that is a mix-
ture of the personally possible valuation functions over F . So, if > is in F
and > is true at all your personally possible worlds, Personal Probabilism
requires you to be certain of>. This is just what I called Personal Logicality
when discussing Dogramaci’s objection above.
Now, as we note when we introduce the problem of logical omniscience,
all tautologies, however complex, are true at all logically possible worlds.
However, for any particular tautology, and especially for complex ones,
you might nonetheless not realise that it is a tautology and true at all log-
ically possible worlds. And, if that’s the case, rationality doesn’t require
you to be certain of it. Similarly, then, surely > might be true at all your
personally possible worlds without you realising this. And, if that’s the
case, surely rationality doesn’t require you to be certain of >. The problem
of logical omniscience, which says that it is too demanding to require you
to be certain of all tautologies, returns in the guise of the problem of per-
sonal omniscience, which says that it is too demanding to require you to
be certain of each credal object that is true at all your personally possible
worlds. But the parallel is spurious. A credal object is true at all personally
possible worlds only if your cognitive activities and processes have ruled
out all worlds at which it is false. This cannot happen without you realising
it. And if it’s happened, then it is not too demanding to require you to be
certain of that credal object.
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4.2 The rationality of logical ignorance and logical sloth
You might worry that the solution to the problem of logical omniscience
that we’ve been developing here renders logical sloth and extreme logical
ignorance rationally permissible. That is, you might think that our frame-
work furnishes us with no way to rationally criticise someone who fails
to perform even basic logical reasoning to discover logical connections be-
tween the credal objects they entertain. On an account on which logical
omniscience is rationally required, there is an incentive to learn more logi-
cal truths: while you will almost certainly remain ignorant of some logical
truths, and therefore irrational on this account, you will at least become less
and less irrational the more logical truths you learn—you will approach
the ideal of rationality more closely. But on the Hacking-inspired account
I have been developing, you might worry that there is no such incentive,
and no way to criticise a person who does no logical reasoning.
However, as Hacking (1967) already observed in his original treatment,
I. J. Good’s Value of Information theorem already answers this objection
(Good, 1967).8 Here’s the set-up for Good’s theorem. Suppose you will
face a decision between a range of options on Wednesday. And suppose
that, on Wednesday, you’ll pick an option that maximises your expected
utility from the point of view of the credences you assign on that day. Now,
suppose that, on Tuesday, you can choose whether or not to receive some
information, and update on it by conditionalizing. Let’s say that the infor-
mation tells you which element of the partition E = {E1, . . . , Ek} contains
the actual world. For ease of initial exposition, we’ll assume that your cre-
dence function is defined on each personally possible world inW—that is,
for each personally possible world, there is a credal object in F that is true
only at that world. Later, we’ll explain how to lift that requirement. Good’s
theorem then says that, on Monday, you will expect yourself to choose a
better outcome on Wednesday if you received the information on Tuesday
and updated on that than if you didn’t and retained your old credences. In
symbols, if we say that ac is an option that maximises expected utility rel-
ative to credence function c, and ac
′
i is an option that maximises expected
utility relative to c′i, then
• by the lights of your prior c, the expected utility of not receiving the
information is
∑
w∈W
c(w)u(ac, w)
• by the lights of your prior c, the expected utility of receiving the in-
8It’s pretty clear that Savage already knew what’s come to be known as Good’s theorem
when he was writing The Foundations of Statistics (Savage, 1954, Section 7.3).
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formation and updating by conditionalizing on it is
∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(ac
′
i , w)
Good’s theorem says
Theorem 8 If c is your prior, E = {E1, . . . , Ek} is a partition ofW that is repre-
sented in F , and c′ is a conditionalizing rule for c, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)u(ac, w) ≤ ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(ac
′
i , w)
with the inequality strict if there is Ei in E such that (i) c(Xi) > 0 and (ii) the
options that maximise expected utility by the lights of c′i are different from those
that maximise expected utility by the lights of c.
This is often glossed: if the information on Tuesday is free, you’re permitted
to take it; if the information on Tuesday is free, and it might change your
mind about the decision on Wednesday, then you’re obliged to take it. Now,
logical information isn’t free. It takes time and cognitive resources to create
or follow logical reasoning to obtain that information. So it might seem
that Good’s Theorem is not relevant here. But of course, it’s not only if the
information is free that you are obliged to take it. You’re also obliged if its
cost is lower than the expected difference between the utility of choosing
after learning the information and the utility of choosing without learning
the information. Thus, suppose it costs r utiles to learn which element of E
contains the actual world. Then, you are obliged to take the information if
r < ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)u(ac
′
i , w)− ∑
w∈W
c(w)u(ac, w)
So there is a way to criticise someone who doesn’t reason logically. If the
gain in the expected utility of your future decisions exceeds the cost of that
reasoning, then you’re obliged to do it, and you can be rationally criticized
if you don’t.
What’s more, there’s an accuracy-based version of Good’s Theorem.9
Not only does learning increase the expected utility of your future deci-
sion making, it also increases the expected utility of your future credences.
Suppose I is a strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then
• by the lights of your prior c, the expected inaccuracy of not receiving
the information is
∑
w∈W
c(w)I(c, w)
9This follows from the same reasoning used by Greaves & Wallace (2006) in their ex-
pected accuracy argument for conditionalization.
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• by the lights of your prior c, the expected inaccuracy of receiving the
information and updating by conditionalizing on it is
∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)I(c′i, w)
The accuracy version of Good’s theorem says
Theorem 9 Suppose I is an additive continuous strictly proper inaccuracy mea-
sure. Then, if c is your prior, E = {E1, . . . , Ek} is a partition ofW that is repre-
sented in F , and c′ is a conditionalizing rule for c, then
∑
w∈W
c(w)I(c, w) ≥ ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
c(w)I(c′i, w)
with the inequality strict if there is Ei in E such that c(Xi) > 0 and c 6= c′i.
Thus, again, if the information is free, you should take it. In order to say
when you’re obliged to pay a particular amount for the information, we
need to specify an exchange rate between practical utility and epistemic
utility. How much are you prepared to pay for a particular increase in
your expected accuracy? But once we specify this, we can again rationally
criticize someone who doesn’t pay that amount.
So far, our presentation of the pragmatic and epistemic versions of Good’s
theorem have applied only in cases in which your prior is defined on each
possible world inW . But, as we have emphasised throughout, that is not
the typical case. How might those arguments run if we do not assume that?
If a credence function c satisfies Personal Probabilism, then it is a weighted
average of the valuation functions of the individual’s personally possible
worlds. That is, there is a sequence (λw)w∈W of weights, where 0 ≤ λw ≤ 1
and ∑w∈W λw = 1 and
c(−) = ∑
w∈W
λwvw(−)
We might think of λw as a possible credence you might assign to w if c is
your credence function. It is a way of assigning credences to the personally
possible worlds inW so that they are consistent with the credences that c
already assigns. Now, note that the sequence (λw)w∈W need not be unique.
There might be an alternative sequence (δw)w∈W such that 0 ≤ δw ≤ 1 and
∑w∈W δw = 1 and
c(−) = ∑
w∈W
δwvw(−) = ∑
w∈W
λwvw(−)
Now, given any sequence (λw)w∈W of weights, we can define expectations
relative to them. For instance, the implicit expected utility of not receiv-
ing the evidence from partition E = {E1, . . . , Ek} relative to the weights
(λw)w∈W is
∑
w∈W
λwu(ac, w)
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While the implicit expected utility of receiving the evidence relative to
those weights is
∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
λwu(ac
′
i , w)
And similarly for the implicit expected inaccuracy of both options. Now,
again, we can show that
∑
w∈W
λwu(ac, w) ≤ ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
λwu(ac
′
i , w)
And that gives the general pragmatic version of Good’s theorem. Similarly,
we can show that
∑
w∈W
λwI(c, w) ≥ ∑
Ei∈E
∑
w∈Ei
λwI(c′i, w)
which gives the general accuracy-based version of Good’s theorem.
Given that, for many credence functions, there will be multiple sequences
of weights, and therefore multiple assessments of expected utility relative
to weights, and perhaps some that disagree on the ordering of the two op-
tions, we must say when an option is permitted and when it is mandated by
such a credence function. I hope it is uncontroversial to say that an option
is mandated by a credence function if it maximises expected utility rela-
tive to all possible sequences of weights. And this provides us with a way
of rationally criticizing any individual who fails to seek out logical truths
when doing so would increase their implicit expected utility or accuracy
more than it would cost them to do so relative to all sequences of possible
weights.
There are at least two compelling features of this approach to the prob-
lem of logical sloth. The first is that it matches our intuitive judgments
about when an individual’s logical ignorance is irrational. For instance, we
judge a logically competent individual irrational if they are less than cer-
tain of ¬(A ∨ B) → ¬A. The reason is that the cost of reasoning to this
conclusion will be extremely low. And, in general, we’re more inclined to
judge a logically ignorant person irrational if the logical truths of which
they are less than certain are simpler and less costly to reason towards.
Notice that we thereby avoid the rather delicate business of determin-
ing when a logical contradiction is subtle or complex or advanced—in which
case believing it or having high credence in it might be rationally permissible—
and when it is blatant or trivial or obvious—in which case rationality might
require us to disbelief it or have very low credence in it. And it manages to
avoid it without making evaluations of rationality vague or indeterminate
at the borderline between subtle and blatant contradictions (Lewis, 2004;
Jago, 2014; Berto, 2014).
Our approach also allows us to make judgments of rationality that are
appropriately relativised to an individual. For instance, it might allow us
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to say that I am irrational if I’m less than certain of de Morgan’s laws, be-
cause I’ve studied classical logic extensively, I’ve taught it, and I’ve worked
through the derivation a hundred times; but a student in my first-year logic
class, who has just learned the method of truth tables might not be irra-
tional if they are less that certain of that law, because working through a
derivation of it would cost that student much more than it would cost me.
This feature of our account allows us to answer an objection to Hack-
ing’s view raised by Jens Christian Bjerring and Mattias Skipper. They
claim that, while Hacking successfully accounts for the rationality of logi-
cal ignorance, his picture fails to capture “what ordinary humans can and
cannot infer given their limited cognitive resources” (Bjerring & Skipper,
ta, 8). The diachronic norms for logical updating laid out in the previous
section partially answer this by saying how to update when you do learn;
and the norms for logical inquiry laid out in this section complete the an-
swer by saying when you should put in the effort to learn. What’s more,
by appealing to Good’s theorem, we secure a pleasingly general account.
We needn’t claim that all logical learning comes from following the rules
of some deductive system, nor that there is some precise length of deduc-
tion within that system that we are capable of generating, nor that there is
some impoverished language within which all of our logical reasoning at a
given time must take place (Gaifman, 2004; Bjerring & Skipper, ta). Rather,
we simply say that, however you might learn logical truths, you should
choose to learn them iff doing so maximises your expected utility.
Nonetheless, the account I have given here does leave open a significant
question, and it is perhaps the central question of Skipper and Bjerring’s
paper. How should we model actual logical reasoning epistemically? For
me and for Hacking, this is part of what I called the input problem above,
following Jonathan Weisberg. As I said there, I will not address it here. But
perhaps I can adopt Skipper and Bjerring’s answer. Thus, in the end, I think
my project and theirs are complementary, not incompatible. They will tell
you how to get to the point of learning a logical truth; I will then say how
to update your credences on the basis of that achievement.
The second compelling feature of our approach is that it explains why
individuals with none of the computational, processing, or storage limi-
tations that we have should be logically omniscient, but not empirically
omniscient. For such creatures, there is no cost whatsoever to undertaking
the logical reasoning required to be omniscient. Providing logical knowl-
edge can be acquired immediately and without incurring any opportunity
or resource costs, Good’s theorem shows that such an agent is rationally
required to acquire all such knowledge. But for such creatures there is still
a cost to gathering empirical evidence, and so they might not be rationally
required to do that.
This provides a principled motivation for a norm of logical omniscience
for ideal agents, but not a norm of empirical omniscience. It thereby pro-
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vides an alternative justification for Declan Smithies’ Asymmetry Thesis, at
least for that sort of agent.
Asymmetry Thesis Rationality requires omniscience and infal-
libility in logical domains but not empirical domains. (Smithies,
2015, 2772)
Smithies justifies that thesis in quite a different way, and by appealing to a
reasons-based account of rationality. It is interesting that we can motivate
the same principle from our teleological view of rationality.
5 Conclusion
The two major arguments for synchronic norms in credal epistemology, the
Dutch Book and Accuracy Dominance Arguments—seem to demand logi-
cal omniscience. Yet that seems far too strong. Ian Hacking saw where the
problem lay: since both rely on dominance reasoning, these two arguments
require us to specify the set of dominance-relevant worlds; in the standard
versions of the arguments, these are the logically possible worlds; in the
case of the Dutch Book Argument, Hacking saw that they should instead be
the personally possible worlds; and the same reasoning carries over to the
Accuracy Dominance Argument. Replacing the logically possible worlds
with the personally possible ones, we obtain a less demanding, more plau-
sible norm, namely, Personal Probabilism. But this is a synchronic norm,
so it does not tell us how to update when we learn logical facts and narrow
our set of personally possible worlds. To do that, we introduced the di-
achronic versions of the Dutch Book and Accuracy Dominance Arguments
and showed that they demand superconditioning as the rational updating
rule. We then considered two objections to the framework that thereby
grows out of Hacking’s insight.
That framework contains multitudes. Beyond what we have seen here,
Robbie Williams (2018) has applied Hacking’s insight to the case in which
the individual does not know which logic governs the objects to which she
assigns credences, though she knows which follow from which according
to the different logics she thinks are possible. But of course, an individ-
ual might be ignorant of both. Consider, for instance, an individual who
doesn’t know whether it is classical logic or the logic of paradox that gov-
erns her credal objects; and, moreover, she doesn’t know all of the logical
relationships that hold between those objects according to the two logics.
Hacking’s framework of personally possible worlds can represent such an
individual and provide a norm that governs her credences at each time, and
a norm that governs the way she updates on her evidence between those
times.
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Looking beyond credal epistemology, we can apply this framework
to solve the problem of logical omniscience in the case of full belief as
well. Building on work by Kenny Easwaran (2016) and Kevin Dorst (2017),
Daniel Rothschild (2019) has provided notions of incoherence and accu-
racy dominance for sets of full beliefs. That is, (i) he specifies the bets that
a set of beliefs require you to accept, and then says that a set is incoher-
ent, and therefore irrational, if there is a series of bets each of which the
set requires you to accept, but which taken together will lose you money
at all possible worlds; and (ii) he specifies inaccuracy measures for sets of
beliefs, and says that one is accuracy dominated relative to such a measure,
and therefore irrational, if there is an alternative that is less inaccurate at all
possible worlds. What’s more, he has shown which sets of full beliefs are
incoherent and which are accuracy dominated. If we take the dominance-
relevant worlds to be the logically possible worlds, then a set of full beliefs
is not incoherent just in case it is almost Lockean complete for some threshold
1
2 < t < 1—that is, there is a credence function c that satisfies Probabil-
ism such that (i) if c(X) > t, then X is in the set of full beliefs and (ii) if
c(X) < t, then X is not in the set of full beliefs. And exactly the same sets
of beliefs are not accuracy dominated, again taking the logically possible
worlds to be the dominance-relevant ones. Now, since c satisfies Probabil-
ism, c(>) = 1 > t for any logical truth >, and so full beliefs are required
to be logically omniscient. However, if we appeal to Hacking’s insight and
let the dominance-relevant worlds instead be the personally possible ones
as we did above, Rothschild’s theorems establish that a set of full beliefs is
not incoherent just in case there is a credence function c that satisfies Per-
sonal Probabilism such that (i) if c(X) > t, then X is in the set of full beliefs
and (ii) if c(X) < t, then X is not in the set of full beliefs. Thus, we obtain
synchronic norms for sets of full beliefs that do not demand logical omni-
science. It is an interesting and open question which updating rules for sets
of full beliefs are not vulnerable to diachronic versions of the Dutch Book
and Accuracy Dominance arguments for full beliefs.
6 Proofs
Suppose:
• F = {X1, . . . , Xn}
• E = {E1, . . . , Ek}
Given a prior credence function c defined on F , represent it by the vector
〈c(X1), . . . , c(Xn)〉
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Given a posterior credence function c′i defined on F , represent it by the
vector
〈c′i(X1), . . . , c′i(Xn)〉
Given a pair (c, c′), where c is a prior and c′ is an updating rule on E =
{E1, . . . , Ek}, represent it by the vector
(c, c′) = c _ c′1 _ . . . _ c
′
k
where _ is the concatenation operator between vectors, so that
〈a1, . . . , an〉_ 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 = 〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn〉
And thus
(c, c′) = 〈c(X1), . . . , c(Xn), c′1(X1), . . . , c′1(Xn), . . . , c′k(X1), . . . , c′k(Xn)〉
Given a pair (c, c′) and a world w in Ei, let
(c, c′)w = vw _ c′1 _ . . . _ c
′
i−1 _ vw _ c
′
i+1 _ . . . _ c
′
k
The key fact is this:
Lemma 10 c′ is a superconditioning rule for c iff c is in the convex hull of {(c, c′)w :
w ∈ W}.10
Proof. First, left-to-right. Suppose c′ is superconditioning for c. Then for
each w inW , there is 0 ≤ λw ≤ 1 such that
(i) c(−) = ∑w∈W λwvw(−), and
(ii) for Ei in E , if ∑w∈Ei λw > 0,
c′i(−) =
∑w∈Ei λwvw(−)
∑w∈Ei λw
Then
(c, c′) = ∑
w∈W
λw(c, c′)w
After all, by (i), c(−) = ∑w∈W λwvw(−). And, by (ii), for all Ei in E ,(
∑
w∈Ei
λw
)
c′i(−) = ∑
w∈Ei
λwvw(−)
so
c′i(−) = ∑
w∈Ei
λwvw(−) + ∑
w 6∈Ei
λwc′i(−)
10Recall: the convex hull of a set is the smallest convex set that includes that set.
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as required.
Second, right-to-left. Suppose
(c, c′) = ∑
w∈W
λw(c, c′)w
Then c(−) = ∑w∈W λwc(−), which gives (i). And
c′i(−) = ∑
w∈Ei
λwvw(−) + ∑
w 6∈Ei
λwc′i(−)
which ensures that, if ∑w∈Ei λw > 0, then
c′i(−) =
∑w∈Ei λwvw(−)
∑w∈Ei λw
which gives (ii). That completes the proof. 2
Theorem 5 (c, c′) is diachronically incoherent overW iff c′ is not a supercondi-
tioning rule for c.
Proof of Theorem 5. We will prove only the left-to-right direction; the other
direction is straightforward. Suppose c′ is not a superconditioning rule for
c. Then (c, c′) is not in the convex hull of {(c, c′)w : w ∈ W}. So, by the
Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there is a vector
S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn, S11, . . . , S1n, . . . , Sk1, . . . , Skn〉
such that, for all w inW ,
S · ((c, c′)w − (c, c′)) < 0.
Now, if w is in Ei, then
(c, c′)w − (c, c′) =
(vw − c)_ (c′1 − c′1)_ . . .
. . . _ (c′i−1 − c′i−1)_ (w− c′i)_ (c′i+1 − c′i+1)_ . . .
. . . _ (c′n − c′n) =
(vw − c)_ 0 _ . . . 0 _ (vw − c′i)_ 0 _ . . . _ 0
So, for all w in Ei,
S · ((c, c′)w − (c, c′))
= (S1, . . . , Sn) · (vw − c) + (Si1, . . . , Sin) · (vw − c′i)
=
n
∑
j=1
Sj(vw(Xj)− c(Xj)) +
n
∑
j=1
Sij(vw(Xj)− c(Xj))
< 0
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Thus, at the earlier time, we offer each $Sj-bet on Xj for $Sjc(Xj). And c
demands you accept each at that price. And at the later time, if you learn
Ei, we offer each $Sij-bet on Xj for $S
i
jc
′
i(Xj). And c
′
i demands you accept
each at that price. Now, the total payout of the bets at world w in Ei is:
n
∑
j=1
vw(Xj)(Sj + Sij)
while the total price of the bets is
n
∑
j=1
Sjc(Xj) +
n
∑
j=1
Sijc(Xj)
But, by the inequality above, the total price exceeds the total payout at
every personally possible world. That completes the proof. 2
Theorem 7 Suppose I is an additive strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then
(c, c′) is accuracy dominated overW relative to I iff c′ is not a superconditioning
rule for c.
Proof of Theorem 7. Again, we prove only the left-to-right direction. Sup-
pose I is an additive, strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then, by Propo-
sition 2 in (Predd et al., 2009), there is a Bregman divergence D : [0, 1]n →
[0,∞] such that I(c, w) = D(vw, c). Then extend D to be the Bregman di-
vergence between n(k+ 1)-dimensional vectors that sums the Bregman di-
vergences between the k + 1 n-dimensional vectors. Thus,
D(b _ b1 _ . . . _ bk, c _ c1 _ . . . _ ck) = D(b, c) +
k
∑
i=1
D(bi, ci)
Now suppose c′ is not a superconditioning rule for c. Then (c, c′) is not in
the convex hull of {(c, c′)w : w ∈ W}. So, by Proposition 3 of (Predd et al.,
2009), there is (c?, c?′) such that, for all Ei in E and w in Ei,
D(w _ c′1 _ . . . c
′
i−1 _ w _ c
′
i+1 _ . . . _ c
′
n, c?′ _ c?′1 _ . . . _ c
?′
n )
< D(w _ c′1 _ . . . c
′
i−1 _ w _ c
′
i+1 _ . . . _ c
′
n, c _ c′1 _ . . . _ c
′
n)
But
D(w _ c′1 _ . . . c
′
i−1 _ w _ c
′
i+1 _ . . . _ c
′
n, c _ c′1 _ . . . _ c
′
n) =
D(w, c) +D(w, c′i) = I((c, c
′), w)
And
D(w _ c′1 _ . . . c
′
i−1 _ w _ c
′
i+1 _ . . . _ c
′
n, c?′ _ c?′1 _ . . . _ c
?′
n ) ≥
D(w, c?) +D(w, c?′i ) = I((c
?, c?′), w)
So I((c?, c?′), w) < I((c, c′), w) for all w inW , as required. This completes
the proof. 2
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